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Abstract—Error correction is an indispensable component
when Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are used in cryp-
tographic applications. So far, there exist schemes that obtain
helper data, which they need within the error correction process.
We introduce a new scheme, which only uses an error correcting
code without any further helper data. The main idea is to con-
struct for each PUF instance an individual code which contains
the initial PUF response as codeword. In this work we use LDPC
codes, however other code classes are also possible. Our scheme
allows a trade-off between code rate and cryptographic security.
In addition, decoding with linear complexity is possible.
Index Terms—Physical Unclonable Functions, Secure Sketch,
Helper Data Generation, Low-Density Parity-Check Codes,
Cryptographic Key Generation and Storage
I. MOTIVATION
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) can be used for
cryptographic purposes like identification, authentication, key
generation and key storage. Using PUFs, keys do not have
to be stored, but can be reproduced when needed. However,
usually some errors occur during the key reproduction process.
Using error correction, the original key can be recovered. In
order to perform error correction, schemes of so-called Secure
Sketches which use an error correcting code together with
helper data were proposed in [1] and [2]. In this work, we
suggest a new scheme, which only uses the code without
any further helper data: Section II gives a more detailed
description of PUFs and Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC)
codes. Section III summarizes known Secure Sketch schemes.
In Section IV, we propose our new scheme. Section V provides
examples. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: Let C(n, k, d) be a linear block code of length
n, dimension k, and minimum distance d. Further, wtH(c)
denotes the Hamming weight of vector c. The Hamming
distance of two vectors c1, c2 is denoted by dH(c1, c2).
II. FUNDAMENTALS
A. Physical Unclonable Functions
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a physical object
which, according to an input (binary string, called challenge),
produces an output (binary string, called response). Since the
calculation of the responses is based on randomness, which
is intrinsic to the object due to technical and physical limi-
tations within the manufacturing process, devices which are
identical in construction produce different, unique responses
for the same inputs. Various PUF constructions have been
proposed. Most often, their randomness is either based on
delays in electronic circuits or on the initialization behavior
of memory cells. These devices are unclonable, since it is
impossible to produce a device with a specific challenge-
response behavior. Uniqueness and unclonability are properties
which make PUFs suitable to use them for cryptographic
applications. For example, a PUF response can be used as
a cryptographic key. Since the randomness is static over
the devices’ lifetime, instead of storing the key in a non-
volatile memory (and thereby making the system vulnerable to
physical attacks), the response can be simply reproduced when
the key is needed. However, there are two major problems:
First, the responses of PUFs are not perfectly reproducible,
since there is a variance caused by environmental factors
(e.g. temperature, supply voltage, aging). Second, responses
are not uniformly distributed. To tackle the first problem,
error correcting codes can be applied. The non-uniformity
can be solved by using cryptographic hash-functions. In this
paper, we focus on the problem of nonperfect reproducible
responses. For a comprehensive overview on PUFs, we refer
to the literature [3], [4], [5].
B. LDPC Codes
Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes are widely used
binary linear block codes, introduced by Gallager in [6].
Definition 1. A (ρ, γ)-regular LDPC code of length n and
dimension k is defined by a low-density 1 (n− k)× n parity
check matrix H with the following properties:
• the number of ones in each row is ρ≪ n
• the number of ones in each column is γ ≪ (n− k)
• for any two columns cj , cj′ , there is at most one row ri
such that rij = rij′ = 1. The same holds for rows.2
If the number of ones in each row or column is not constant,
then the defined code is called irregular LDPC code.
The number of ones in the parity check matrix of a (ρ, γ)-
regular LDPC code is γ · n = ρ · (n − k), the density is
ρ
n
= γ
n−k
, and the coderate is R ≥ 1− γ
ρ
.
There exist many methods to construct LDPC codes. Within
this work we use constructions based on finite geometries and
1The density of a matrix is #non-zero entries
#rows·#columns
2This property is not included in all definitions of LDPC codes. However,
since the constructions based on finite geometries result in this property, we
decided to add it to the definition.
Reed-Solomon codes. For details on LDPC codes, we refer to
standard textbooks on coding theory, e.g. [7], [8].
C. Finite geometries
In [9], the construction of regular LDPC codes using finite
geometries was proposed. We define Euclidean and projective
geometries and explain how to derive LDPC codes.
Definition 2. A Euclidean geometry EG(m, q) consists of
points {p1, . . . , pn} where pi ∈ Fqm (n = qm), and lines
{L1, . . . ,LL}, such that the following axioms hold:
1) There is exactly one line between any points pi and pj .
2) Two lines Li and Lj either intersect in exactly one point
or are parallel.
3) There are three points which are not on the same line.
4) For each point pi /∈ Lj , ∃Ll parallel to Lj .
As derived in [7] and [8], m and q can be used to calculate
• the number of points on each line
ρ = q, (1)
• the number of lines
L =
qm−1 · (qm − 1)
q − 1
, (2)
• and the number of lines which intersect in each point
γ =
qm − 1
q − 1
. (3)
There are q
m
−1
q−1 different lines through the origin, namely
Lj = {αaj : α ∈ Fq, aj ∈ Fqm \ {0}}. (4)
For each line through the origin, there exist the parallel lines
Li,j = {ai + αaj : α ∈ Fq, ai 6= αaj}. (5)
We can derive an L × n matrix H from a geometry con-
structed using Definition 2, where each line of the geometry
is a matrix row and each point is a column. The entries of that
matrix are
hij =
{
1, if pj ∈ Li
0, otherwise.
(6)
In each row Li there are ρ ones which represent the points on
line Li. In each column pj there are γ ones which represent
the lines intersecting in point pj . Note that due to Definition 2
Axiom 1, any two columns of H have at most one position
where they both have a one as entry. Due to Definition 2
Axiom 2, there is at most one position in which any two
rows have entry one. We obtain a matrix of low density which
fulfills all properties given in Definition 1. Hence, it can be
used as parity check matrix of a (ρ, γ)-regular LDPC code.
We give an example to illustrate the construction. We choose
q = m = 2 and obtain the Euclidean geometry EG(2, 2)
visualized in Figure 1 (left). Using m and q we calculate ρ =
p1 p2
p3p4
L1
L6
L3 L4
L5
L2
p3
p1
p5
p2 p4
p6
p7
Fig. 1. Euclidean geometry EG(2,2) constructed according to Definition 2
(left), projective geometry PG(2,2) according to Definition 3 (right).
2, L = 6, and γ = 3 according to Equations (1)-(3). Using
this geometry, we apply Equation (6) to derive
H =


1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1

 ,
which fulfills all the properties given in Definition 1 due to the
construction of the geometry and hence can be used as parity
check matrix of an LDPC code. To define an LDPC code of
length (n− k), the transposed of H can be used.
Also projective geometry can be used. Each point in a
projective geometry is described by a set of vectors instead
of a field element. In contrast to Euclidean geometry, zero
vector and parallel lines do not exist.
Definition 3. A projective geometry PG(m, q) consists of
points p1, . . . , pn
(
n = q
m+1
−1
q−1
)
and Lines L. Each point
is defined to be the set of vectors {α(β0, β1, βm) : βj ∈
Fq, α ∈ Fq \{0}, (β0, β1, βm) 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0)}. Lines are a set
of points which are defined according to the following axioms:
1) There is exactly one line between any points pi and pj .
2) There are four points which are not on the same line.
3) Two lines Li and Lj intersect in exactly one point.
As derived in [7], m and q can be used in order to calculate
• the number of points on each line
ρ = q + 1, (7)
• the number of lines
L =
(qm+1 − 1)(qm − 1)
(q − 1)2(q + 1)
, (8)
• and the number of lines which intersect in each point
γ =
qm − 1
q − 1
. (9)
A line through two points ai and aj is defined as
Li,j = {αiai + αjaj : αi, αj ∈ Fq, (αi, αj) 6= (0, 0)}. (10)
Note that the points ai and aj are both a set of vectors
according to Definition 3. Figure 1 (right) visualizes PG(2,2).
The parity check matrix H of an LDPC code can be derived
analog as in the Euclidean geometry case.
D. LDPC codes based on Reed-Solomon codes
A construction of LDPC codes based on Reed-Solomon
(RS) codes was introduced in [10]. For a parameter ρ (1 ≤ ρ <
q) we construct a Reed-Solomon code C(q−1, q−ρ+1, ρ−1)
over Fq . Shortening C by deleting the first q−ρ−1 information
symbols results in code Cb(ρ, 2, ρ − 1). We choose a c ∈ Cb
with wtH(c) = ρ and generate the set C(1)b = {β · c : β ∈
Fq}. Based on this set, Cb can be partitioned into q cosets
C
(1)
b , . . . , C
(q)
b . For a vector c = (c1, . . . , cρ) we define the
operation z(c) = (z(c1), . . . , z(cρ)), where each z(cj) is a
sparse vector of length q which has a one only at position j
when cj = αj for a generator α of Fq. Using this operation we
transform all sets C(i)b (i = 1, . . . , q) into Z(C(i)b ) = {z(c) :
c ∈ C
(i)
b }. Hence, each codeword is transformed to a vector
of ρ tuples, each having length q. These vectors are used to
construct matrices Ai ∈ Fq×ρq2 whose rows are the codewords
of C(i)b in transformed representation. For 1 ≤ γ ≤ q we define
H =
(
A1, . . . ,Aγ
)T
. (11)
H fulfills the properties of regular LDPC codes and hence can
be used as parity check matrix.
III. KNOWN SECURE SKETCH CONSTRUCTIONS
Secure Sketches were introduced in [1] and [2] and address
the problem that PUF responses are not perfectly reproducible.
Figure 2 visualizes a generic Secure Sketch which consists
of an initialization phase and a reproduction phase. During
initialization, an initial response rI is generated by the PUF
(Figure 2 (a)). The Helper Data Generation unit creates helper
data (Figure 2 (b)), which are stored in the Helper Data
Storage for later usage in the reproduction phase. This storage
does not have to be protected, since the procedure is designed
such that knowing the helper data does not reveal information
about rI that can be exploited by an adversary. Usually,
initialization is performed in a secure environment.
In the reproduction phase, the initial response can be recov-
ered, using a new generated response r and the helper data.
If the PUF produces r (Figure 2 (c)), a decoding algorithm in
the Key Reproduction unit is used, which reproduces rI using
r and the helper data, when dH(rI , r) lies within the error
correction capability of the used code. Finally rI is hashed to
the actual key.
Two specific schemes, the Code-Offset Construction and the
Syndrome Construction, have been suggested in [2] and are
used until now, e.g., in [11], [12], and [13]. We briefly explain
these schemes in Sections III-A and III-B, before we introduce
our new LDPC code based scheme in Section IV.
PUF
(c)
Helper
Data Ge-
neration
(a) (b) Helper
Data
Storage
Key
Repro-
duction
(d)
Hash Key
Initialization phase
Reproduction phase
Fig. 2. Model of a Secure Sketch used for error correction for PUFs.
A. Code-Offset Construction
During the initialization phase, a randomly selected code-
word c of a chosen code is added to the initial response rI
and the result h = rI ⊕c is stored as helper data. After a new
response r is generated in the reproduction phase,
c
′ = r⊕ h
= r⊕ (rI ⊕ c)
= (r⊕ rI︸ ︷︷ ︸
=e
)⊕ c
is calculated using response r and helper data. Since rI and
r have a small distance, r⊕ rI can be interpreted as error e.
Hence, c′ can be interpreted as received word and can be
decoded. If dH(rI , r) is small enough, c and the decoded
version of c′ are the same and the initial response can be
recovered by calculating rI = c⊕ h.
B. Syndrome Construction
Using the syndrome construction, the helper data is the
syndrome generated from initial response rI and parity check
matrix of a chosen code, i.e., h = rTI H. If the PUF is
evaluated in the reproduction phase, the calculation
Hr
T = H(rTI ⊕ e
T )
= HrTI ⊕He
T
= hT ⊕HeT
is performed. After computing HrT ⊕hT the syndrome HeT
remains and we can apply decoding.
IV. A NEW SECURE SKETCH SCHEME
In contrast to the schemes discussed in Section III, our
approach only needs the code and no further helper data. The
main idea of our construction is to design a code C for each
PUF instance, such that the initial response rI , which we want
to use as key, is a codeword.
A. Construction
In the initialization phase, an individual code has to be
generated for each PUF instance. Let rI be the initial response
of length n. We choose one of the methods discussed in Sec-
tions II-C and II-D in order to generate a parity check matrix
of an LDPC code of length n (Figure 3 (a)). Note that there
is no restriction on these LDPC code construction methods,
others are also possible. To enforce rI to be codeword of the
constructed code, we only keep rows which are dual to rI
(Figure 3 (b), bold rows), since the rows of the parity check
matrix are codewords from the dual code. The other rows we
ignore (Figure 3 (c)). Therefore, we choose all lines Li with
〈Li, rI〉 = 0 to be rows of our parity check matrix H. In order
to get a memory efficient implementation, we do not need
to generate the full codes before choosing the dual vectors.
The non-dual vectors can be directly dropped during the code
construction process.
However, due to the elimination of rows which are not
dual to rI , the error correction capability of the constructed
code becomes decreased in comparison to the full code. To
increase the error correction capability again, we have to add
more rows which are dual to rI to get more parity check
equations (Figure 3 (d)). We can obtain these new equations
using the remaining construction methods in order to generate
more LDPC codes with the same parameters.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3. Construction process of an LDPC code with a particular codeword.
(a) Rows of a parity check matrix of a full LDPC code, obtained by using
one of the construction methods given in Sections II-C and II-D. (b) Choose
rows which are dual to the initial response rI . (c) Ignore all other rows.
(d) Construct other rows which are dual to rI in order to obtain good error
correction properties.
Adding new dual rows will increase the rank of the con-
structed matrix. If we have reached the desired rank (remember
that k depends on the rank, since rank(H) = n − k) and
still need more parity check equations to result in a good
error correction performance, we add linear combinations of
existing rows. Doing this, we have to assure that the row
weight of the new vectors does not become too large.
Since the combination of parity check equations from
different code constructions might destroy the regularity of our
constructed code, we create additional parity check equations
whose entries increase the weight of low weight columns in
order to guarantee that the column weight is roughly constant.
This property proved to be beneficial for the convergence
behavior of our decoding algorithm (cf. Section IV-C).
When the PUF reproduces the key in the reproduction phase,
the newly generated response r is interpreted as received word
r = ri + e and hence given to the decoding algorithm. The
decoder outputs rI when dH(rI , r) is small enough.
B. Analysis
We show that the constructed code is an LDPC code which
has rI as one of its codewords. Let BK = {bi} denote the
rows of a parity check matrix obtained by a construction
method K ∈ {EG,PG,RS}. Let B = {bj ∈ BK :
〈bj , rI〉 = 0} be the set of rows which are dual to rI . Further,
let L denote the cardinality of the set B.
Lemma 4. H ⊂ B is parity check matrix of an LDPC code
CL, where n− k = rank(B), with rI ∈ CL.
Proof. B ⊂ C⊥L is obvious since the rows of a parity check
matrix are codewords of the dual code. There exist n − k
rows bi ∈ B such that rank(H) = n−k. Hence G is a k×n
generator matrix of CL and there exists an information word
i such that i ·G = rI .
Lemma 4 can be directly applied to our construction where
the rows of B are taken from different construction methods.
The correctness of our LDPC based Secure Sketch follows
from the error correction capability of the constructed code.
If dH(rI , r) is small enough, the code can correct r into rI
and hence reproduce the initial response.
Considering security, assume an adversary gains access to
the parity check matrix H. Since the correct response is a
codeword, the uncertainty is still as large as the number of
codewords.
Comparing the memory requirements of the different Secure
Sketch constructions, our construction benefits from its sparse
parity check matrix. The helper data generated in the code-
offset construction is a vector of length n, the syndrome
construction only needs to store a vector of length n − k.
Additionally, both constructions need to store a representation
of a code. Since we do not have additional helper data in our
scheme, we only need to store the code. In contrast to previous
constructions we use LDPC codes. They allow an efficient
representation due to their sparse parity check matrices, which
can be stored by using only one integer pair (row, column)
for each 1.
C. Decoding
Several decoding algorithms which can be applied to
LDPC codes have been introduced. We use a simple,
iterative bitflip procedure according to [14], which flips
a bit of the received word in each iteration, aiming for
finally recovering the sent codeword. Let ui be the i-th
unit vector, which has a one at position i and the rest
zeros. WT(r) denotes the Hamming weight of the syndrome
of r. We implemented the algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Bitflip Decoding
Input: r = c+ e
Output: decoding result cˆ.
1 Calculate w = WT(r)
2 if wt(w = 0) then
3 cˆ = r
4 return cˆ
5 for i = 1, . . . , n do
6 ǫi = WT(r+ u
T
i ) + ∆i
7 Find j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with ǫj = min ǫi
8 r = r+ uj
9 Goto 1
Using multiple readouts, we obtain soft information which
can be used by the bitflip algorithm in order to increase the
error correction capability. Figure 4 explains this process,
using m = 3 readouts: We reproduce the PUF response
m times and hence obtain responses r1, . . . , rm. The black
circles in the figure highlight the error positions in the m
responses. If an error occurs at position i in some but not
all of the responses, the response values differ at position
i. By comparing the elements of the m responses we can
identify positions in which an error occurred. In case all m
responses have the same value at position i, with very high
probability there was no error at this position. For all positions
i = 1, . . . , n we define the soft information
∆i =
{
δ1, if r1,i == r2,i == r3,i
δ2, otherwise
for δ1 > δ2 > 0. These values are used in Algorithm 1, Line 6,
in order to increase the values of positions which should not be
chosen for a bitflip. We have to decode all m responses, so a
trade-off between overhead due to readout and error correction
capability can be found depending on application and used
PUF construction.
r1 =
r2 =
r3 =
1 n
error position
Fig. 4. Obtaining soft information by using m = 3 readouts.
We analyze why decoding works. Let r = rI + e be a
response extracted from a PUF. The channel model usually
used for PUFs is the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with
a crossover probability p which is given by the used PUF
construction. For all bI ∈ B it is
〈r,bi〉 = 〈rI ,bi〉+ 〈e,bi〉 = 〈e,bi〉 =: si ∈ {0, 1},
If we calculate si for all i = 1, . . . , L, we get the syndrome
vector s = (s1, . . . , sL). It is WT(r) = WT(e) = wtH(s) =∑L
j=1 = 〈r,bj〉. Let
I˜(j)
{
1, if WT(r) > WT(r+ uj)
0, if WT(r) ≤WT(r+ uj)
(12)
be an indicator function, where a 1 indicates an error at
position j = 1, . . . , n. We use the improved indicator function
I(e) = argmax
j
{WT(r)−WT(r + uj)}. (13)
It is clear that
WT(r) ≤WT(r+ uj)⇒WT(r)−WT(r+ uj) ≤ 0 and
WT(r) > WT(r+ uj)⇒WT(r)−WT(r+ uj) > 0.
Function 13 gives us error position j of the smallest WT(r+
uj). More details about the decoding algorithm can be found
in [14] and [7, Chapter 7].
V. EXAMPLES
We constructed codes of length 128 and 256 using m = 3
readouts. During the construction process we can influence the
rank of the obtained matrix and hence the dimension k of the
code. Note that the larger k, the larger the security level but the
smaller the error correction capability. Due to the flexibility of
the code construction, the trade-off between security and error
correction performance which best fits to application and used
PUF construction can be found. E.g., the error probabilities of
different PUF constructions when reproducing responses given
in [4, Chapter 4.3.4] reveal details about the required error
correction performance. Figure 5 visualizes the block error
probability of a constructed LDPC code of length 128 and
dimension 13. Its parity check matrix has 881 rows. Figure 6
shows the block error probability of a constructed LDPC code
of same length, but dimension 56. For this code, the parity
check matrix has 349 rows. The block error probability of
a length 256 LDPC code of dimension 106 is visualized in
Figure 7. Its parity check matrix has 555 rows. For decoding
the length 128 (256) codes, we used δ1 = 10 and δ2 = 6 (δ1 =
20 and δ2 = 12). The block error probabilities of the LDPC
codes are compared to BCH codes with similar parameters,
since BCH is one of the code classes which are so far most
often used in the PUF scenario [11]. Note that the length 128
LDPC codes outperform the corresponding BCH codes.
We calculated the block error probability for each crossover
probability p by
PBlock(p) =
t∑
i=0
P (i) · Perr(i), (14)
where i is the number of errors,
P (i) =
(
n
i
)
pi(1 − p)n−i (15)
is the probability of i arbitrary errors in n positions, and
Perr(i) is the relative amount of wrong decoded vectors e
of weight i. For the constructed LDPC codes, Perr was
determined via simulations.
p
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1
LDPC n=128, k=13
BCH n=127,k=15
Fig. 5. Block error probability of a constructed LDPC code of length 128
and dimension 13 in comparison to a BCH code with similar parameters.
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LDPC n=128,k=56
BCH n=127, k=57
Fig. 6. Block error probability of a constructed LDPC code of length 128
and dimension 56 in comparison to a BCH code with similar parameters.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a new Secure Sketch scheme which works
by constructing an individual code around an initial PUF
response. Since we do not need additional helper data, the
scheme has a very plain structure. LDPC codes allow a
memory-efficient representation. The bitflip decoding algo-
rithm enables decoding in linear time and can efficiently be
implemented in hardware.
The examples presented in Section V show, that the con-
struction results in codes which are suitable to be applied in the
PUF scenario. However, to apply the construction in practical
scenarios, codes with larger dimensions have to be constructed
to provide cryptographic security. Also, further security issues
have to be deeply investigated. A further interesting question
is, which other code classes can be constructed such that the
initial PUF response is a codeword.
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Fig. 7. Block error probability of a constructed LDPC code of length 256
and dimension 106 in comparison to a BCH code with similar parameters.
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